The Distributive Politics of Electoral Outsiders

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Abstract

In institutionalized party systems, political leaders often reach national office after building a party organization and territorial base. Electoral outsiders can reverse this sequence: they reach the top before constructing the machine needed to sustain support. This paper examines that process through Rafael Correa's first presidential election in Ecuador in 2006. I use municipal census data on clerical workers in public administration and annual capital transfers. Bureaucratic expansion was concentrated in municipalities where Correa received high initial support. Early transfer increases were associated with greater Correa support in 2009, and that electoral geography persisted through 2013. These later election results are descriptive, and bureaucracy growth does not predict additional support in 2013. To address the endogeneity of vote share, I instrument Correa's 2006 support with the average distance from local public schools to repression documented under the 1984–1988 government. The instrumental variable estimates compare municipalities within Ecuador's natural regions and rest on conditional independence and exclusion assumptions. They remain positive and economically meaningful across control sets, although their precision varies. The paper documents how an outsider without an inherited party machine translated an initial electoral geography into an uneven expansion of the state. The transfer evidence is consistent with early coalition consolidation but is not definitive.

Keywords: Political outsiders, tactical redistribution, distributive politics, repression, Ecuador

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1. Introduction

Institutionalized party systems usually channel national political careers through established organizations, local networks, and territorial bases. Electoral outsiders can reverse this sequence. They reach the top before acquiring the machine needed to sustain their initial support and must build territorial organization while governing. Fragmented party systems create more scope for this path to power. When an outsider also seeks constitutional change, institutional reform and distributive politics may become two parts of the same process of constructing political support (Acemoglu et al., 2013).

This paper studies that reversed sequence through Rafael Correa's first presidential election in Ecuador in 2006. Correa had never held elected office, his new movement had no legislative or municipal representation, and voters had no national distributive record on which to evaluate him. I use municipal census data on clerical workers in public administration and annual capital transfers to trace the allocation of state resources after his entry. Bureaucratic expansion was concentrated in municipalities where Correa received high initial support. Municipalities receiving larger transfer increases during 2007–2008 also gave him greater support in 2009, and that electoral geography persisted through 2013. The later election evidence is descriptive.

Ecuador makes this sequence visible. A fragmented party system and a decade of presidential instability preceded the 2006 election. Correa campaigned against the traditional political establishment, promised a constituent assembly, and invoked earlier human-rights abuses as evidence against the old political order. After winning office, he secured a constituent assembly, a new constitution in 2008, and a new presidential mandate in 2009. His government also expanded the state and capital spending. Aggregate studies find limited evidence of large economic costs during the administration's early years (Absher et al., 2020; Funke et al., 2021); the municipal evidence instead reveals how clerical employment in public administration expanded unevenly across space.

The bureaucracy estimates are positive and economically meaningful across the paper's control sets. A difference of one percentage point in Correa's vote share corresponds to estimated bureaucracy growth of roughly 5% of the outcome mean. Descriptive ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates show that municipalities with middle levels of support did not experience gains comparable to municipalities with high support. Capital transfers also became more favorable toward municipalities initially aligned with Correa, although transfers and employment responded along different political margins. These results show how a new electoral geography became as-

sociated with an uneven geographic expansion of the state.

The later elections also define the limits of the consolidation argument. The census measure spans 2001–2010, so it cannot test whether bureaucratic hiring produced Correa's 2009 support. Bureaucracy growth does not predict additional support in 2013 once the 2006 and 2009 votes are included. I therefore interpret the 2009 transfer result as evidence consistent with early consolidation, not as a definitive causal estimate. The 2013 results document persistence but do not show that bureaucracy or further transfers generated additional support.

The connection between Correa's outsider appeal and locally rooted political memory motivates the instrument. Repression under Febres-Cordero produced geographically concentrated experiences of torture, disappearance, unlawful detention, and other abuses. Such experiences can shape later political behavior through local memory and social transmission (Rozenas et al., 2017; Bautista et al., 2021; Henn and Huff, 2023). Schools provide stable community locations around which families, teachers, students, and residents may transmit knowledge of nearby events. Correa's anti-establishment and human-rights discourse gave those grievances contemporary political expression (Cerbino et al., 2016). I therefore use the distance between the local school network and documented repression locations to predict his initial support. Schools are neither treated as a cause of political attitudes nor as sites of repression. Their proximity measures settings in which memories of nearby repression could remain salient.

To address the endogeneity of electoral support, I use an instrumental variables (IV) design. The instrument is the average distance from local public schools to documented repression under the 1984–1988 government of León Febres-Cordero. The IV estimand captures the relationship between bureaucracy and continuous differences in Correa's 2006 vote share induced by this distance measure. The estimates compare municipalities within Ecuador's natural regions after conditioning on the stated covariates. They do not compare regions with one another, and the instrument does not support a separate estimate based only on variation within provinces.

The identifying claim is conditional. Repression was not unconditionally random, and the paper does not treat it as such. Following Bautista et al. (2021), I assume that the instrument is as good as randomly assigned only after conditioning on predetermined municipal characteristics, geography, baseline state presence, and region fixed effects. The exclusion restriction separately requires the instrument to affect subsequent bureaucracy only through Correa's initial support, conditional on those covariates. Historical political balance tests, baseline public service tests, and alternative controls assess this conditional claim against the observed historical alternatives.

Under these assumptions, the estimates are consistent with greater initial support shaping later bureaucracy. Their precision varies across specifications, so I treat them as conditional rather than definitive causal evidence.

The paper speaks to constitutional political economy because political support for institutional change and the distribution of state resources need not be independent. Voters may support projects that weaken checks and balances when they expect redistribution or policy change (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Once in office, an outsider must make that new coalition durable. Public employment can provide a persistent and locally embedded commitment device while the government reshapes political institutions (Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Under the stated identifying assumptions, the IV design provides conditional evidence that initial support shaped subsequent allocation. It does not establish that bureaucratic hiring caused later electoral support or constitutional referendum voting.

This paper contributes to three related literatures. First, it adds to research on distributive politics and public employment (Alesina et al., 2000, 2001; Golden and Min, 2013; Maurer, 2018). Existing studies often ask whether public programs generate electoral support, including the evidence from Peru and Mexico in Schady (2000) and Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2016). I instead study how support in an outsider's first national election shapes later allocation, before voters can respond to that government's national distributive record. Second, the paper adds a territorial dimension to research on political outsiders and institutional change (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020; Funke et al., 2021). It examines the less familiar sequence in which an outsider reaches national office first and constructs a political coalition while governing and reshaping institutions. Third, it connects research on the political persistence of repression (Rozenas et al., 2017; Bautista et al., 2021; Henn and Huff, 2023) to outsider mobilization and distributive politics. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first quantitative study to link the electoral geography of Correa's initial victory to the municipal allocation of public resources during his first years in office.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and Ecuadorian context. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, and Section 5 reports the bureaucracy results. Section 6 examines municipal transfers and subsequent electoral support. Section 7 concludes.

2. Conceptual and institutional context

2.1. Conceptual Framework

This paper studies distributive politics when a political outsider reaches national office before building a territorial party organization. Established party systems often channel political careers upward through local organization. Fragmented systems give outsiders more room to reverse that sequence. Correa won the presidency first and then built a durable coalition while governing. Voters may rationally support political projects that weaken checks and balances when they expect redistribution or reform (Acemoglu et al., 2013). The outsider must then consolidate support formed before the government produced a national distributive record.

Political outsiders face a distinct problem. Unlike established politicians, they lack reputational capital, party organizations, and prior distributive records. As a result, electoral support in a first national election reflects initial political alignment rather than sustained loyalty. While outsider candidates can mobilize support by presenting themselves as a rupture with an existing institutional order, this support is inherently fragile. Ecuador is especially useful for studying this problem because it reveals initial support at an unusually early stage of political organization, before the government established a national distributive record.

Outsider entry also sharpens a classic question in the distributive politics literature: should governments direct resources toward core supporters or toward swing voters? In more established party systems, targeting swing voters may be attractive because parties already possess organizational infrastructure and can seek to maximize marginal electoral returns. For outsider governments, however, the problem is different. Without an inherited territorial machine, the immediate challenge is not only to win additional votes, but to stabilize and organize the coalition that first brought the outsider to power. Under these conditions, rewarding areas of core support may be more attractive than targeting swing voters, since strongholds offer lower political uncertainty and higher organizational returns (Cox and Mccubbins, 1986). Durable patronage in these territories can help transform initial electoral support into brokers, activists, and local networks that sustain the new movement over time. This argument predicts that bureaucratic expansion will be concentrated in municipalities that provided high initial support rather than in municipalities near the middle of the support distribution.


Historical grievances associated with past repression provide one channel through which outsiders can mobilize early support. By linking past repression to the institutional order they

seek to dismantle, outsiders can make such grievances politically salient. The empirical strategy measures each municipality's exposure using the average proximity of its public schools to documented repression. Schools provide stable community settings in which families, teachers, students, and residents can transmit knowledge of nearby events across generations. Shorter distance therefore proxies greater scope for local memories of repression to remain salient. This mechanism should matter most in the outsider's first election and weaken once the outsider becomes part of the political establishment.

Once in office, outsider governments face a commitment problem. Promises of future redistribution may not be credible under weak institutional constraints. Following Robinson and Verdier (2013), durable and discretionary distributive tools can serve as commitment devices that stabilize early political coalitions. Public employment is locally embedded, persistent, and difficult to reverse. It can also help create the territorial organization that new movements initially lack. The framework therefore predicts that outsider governments will reward early supporters through durable distributive instruments during the administration's initial phase, with especially strong effects in their strongest territories.

Figure 1 summarizes the main empirical argument. The first two arrows motivate the instrument: historical repression can leave local political memories that an outsider later activates. The final arrow asks whether the initial support predicted by the instrument shaped the subsequent allocation of bureaucracy. The figure describes the proposed mechanism; it does not assign the same causal status to every arrow. I examine capital transfers separately as complementary evidence. Their annual frequency provides a more precise timeline of fiscal allocation and shows whether a more flexible resource followed the same electoral geography.

Figure 1: From local political memory to the allocation of public resources



Note: The first two arrows summarize the mechanism motivating the instrument. Under the conditional independence and exclusion assumptions, the IV design links initial support predicted by the instrument to subsequent bureaucracy. The figure does not treat each step as separately identified.

2.2. Ecuador before *Correísmo*

Ecuador returned to democracy in 1979. León Febres-Cordero of the right-wing Social Christian Party (PSC) won the presidency in 1984. His confrontational administration weakened institutional checks and used police and security forces against opponents during its conflict with the armed group Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) (Moncagatta and Espinosa, 2019). The repression documented for 1984–1988 included torture, disappearance, unlawful detention, kidnapping, and violations of due process (Ayala Mora, 2008; Comisión de la verdad, 2010). These were geographically concentrated episodes of state repression under an elected government. They were less extensive than the mass repression associated with Southern Cone dictatorships, but they remained politically salient within Ecuador.

Several cases became lasting national and local reference points. The disappearance of the Restrepo brothers became the most widely known civilian case. The 1987 Taura military revolt, during which officers briefly detained Febres-Cordero, was followed by unlawful detention and mistreatment of participants (Comisión de la verdad, 2010). Media coverage, victims' organizations, legal proceedings, and discussion within affected communities kept these episodes in public memory after the administration ended.

The center-left Democratic Left (ID) defeated the PSC in the 1988 presidential election and pursued negotiations with AVC. The municipal returns used later to evaluate conditional political balance come from Darlić's compilation of Ecuadorian election statistics (Darlić, 1987). Political stability did not last. A severe financial crisis in 1999 and repeated presidential removals deepened distrust of established parties. Between 1996 and 2006, seven presidents served in office. By the 2006 election, Ecuador's party system was fragmented and voters had repeatedly shifted toward candidates who challenged the traditional political establishment.

2.3. Ecuador during *Correísmo*


Rafael Correa entered this setting as a genuine electoral outsider. Before 2006, he had never held elected office. Alianza PAIS was a new movement with no incumbent legislators or municipal governments, and it did not present congressional candidates in the 2006 election. Correa therefore entered the presidency without an inherited territorial party machine or a national record of distributing public resources.

Correa campaigned against the *partidocracia*, his term for the traditional party establishment, and promised a constituent assembly. Voters authorized that process in 2007, Alianza PAIS won

a majority in the assembly election, and voters approved the new constitution in 2008. The new institutional framework strengthened executive influence over public policy and was followed by general elections in 2009, which Correa won. Alianza PAIS and allied candidates also acquired municipal representation. This sequence matters because constitutional change and the construction of a new territorial coalition occurred together during the administration's first years.

The government expanded public spending, public employment, and the role of the central state during the same period. This paper studies two resources with distinct political uses. The census measure records where clerical jobs in public administration were located and provides a durable, locally embedded measure of redistribution. Capital transfers record funds sent by the central government to municipal governments and provide an annual measure of fiscal allocation. Figure 2 places these changes in the broader decline in constraints on executive authority recorded by Polity V.

Figure 2: Checks and balances on the executive




2.4. The Truth Commission

Correa connected his attack on the traditional establishment to its human-rights record. His campaign and political discourse singled out the PSC and the Febres-Cordero period as symbols of an opaque and abusive political order (Cerbino et al., 2016). This discourse did not create the underlying experiences. It gave contemporary political meaning to memories already sustained through affected families, communities, media coverage, and legal claims.

After the 2006 election, Correa established the Truth Commission in 2007 to investigate human-rights violations. Its final report covered cases from 1984 to 2008 and recorded the largest number during the 1984–1988 Febres-Cordero government (Comisión de la verdad, 2010). Because the Commission followed the election, it cannot explain Correa's initial 2006 support. I use the report

to locate previously occurring repression and as evidence that these episodes remained salient under his government. Figure 3 maps the 1984–1988 locations used to construct the instrument.

Figure 3: Georeferenced repression locations recorded by the Truth Commission



Note: Red triangles mark the georeferenced locations of repression episodes recorded by Comisión de la verdad (2010).

The empirical strategy uses variation in how close municipal school networks were to these documented locations. Schools are long-lived community institutions where information can circulate across generations; they are not treated as repression sites or as a direct cause of political preferences. The proposed channel is that knowledge of nearby repression persisted locally and that Correa's outsider discourse activated the resulting grievances in 2006. Table A7 shows that the documented locations were not confined to either the largest or the richest municipalities.

Ecuador therefore combines three features needed for the analysis: geographically specific memories of earlier repression, an outsider campaign that made those memories politically relevant, and a new government that expanded the state while building a territorial organization. Under the stated assumptions, the IV strategy links the component of initial support predicted by the instrument to subsequent bureaucracy. It does not assume that all political support in Ecuador arose from repression or that the instrument is unconditionally random.

3. Data

The analysis combines Ecuador's 2001 and 2010 national censuses, produced by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC), with election returns from the National Electoral Council. Appendix Section A explains the data construction, and Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.[1]

3.1. Data construction

The census and electoral files use different identifiers for parishes and municipalities. I aggregate both sources to the municipal level and match municipalities by name and province using INEC's administrative classification.[2]

3.2. Bureaucracy data

I identify bureaucratic employment by combining the industry and occupation codes in the national censuses. The measure intersects public administration in the International Standard Industrial Classification with clerical work in the International Standard Classification of Occupations. I harmonize the corresponding categories across the 2001 and 2010 censuses.[3] Throughout the paper, I use *bureaucracy* as shorthand for these clerical and office jobs in public administration. The measure does not include teachers, healthcare workers, or all public sector employment. I then aggregate the records to municipalities and construct the number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants.

3.3. Electoral data

Ecuador's National Electoral Council provides election returns from 2002 onward, although some referendum data from 2006–2017 are unavailable.[4] For the later election exercise, I calculate Correa's vote share as his votes divided by votes for all presidential candidates plus null votes; blank votes are excluded. I reconstruct the 2013 municipal share from the original electoral records and merge it to the paper sample using official municipality identifiers. The same denominator convention is used for the 2009 share.

[1] Gachet (2020) constructed the first version of this dataset. The version used here corrects and extends those data.
[2] INEC codes identify provinces, municipalities, and parishes hierarchically. Some municipalities share a name, so the match also uses the province. Appendix A provides an example.
[3] For 2010, I use the industry category "public administration" and the occupation category "office clerk." For 2001, I use "public administration and application" and "other office clerks."
[4] The unavailable files include the referendums on convening a constituent assembly and approving the new constitution.

Ecuador elects presidents in two rounds. All registered candidates compete in the first round, and the two leading candidates proceed to a runoff if no candidate meets the constitutional threshold for a first-round victory. I use Correa's first-round vote share in 2006 because it records support for him before the choice narrowed to two candidates and before he held national office.

3.4. Repression and school locations

Report number three from the Truth Commission describes each case and identifies where it occurred (Comisión de la verdad, 2010). I reviewed the cases and geocoded the specific location whenever the report provided enough information.[5] When the report did not identify a more precise location, I assigned the episode to the principal parish of the municipality. The cases include torture, kidnapping, and judicial malpractice, and these classifications can overlap. The available data do not support a credible decomposition by type of repression.

I combine these locations with the Ministry of Education's 2014 administrative registry, the most comprehensive georeferenced inventory of public schools available for this purpose. For each active public school, I calculate the distance to the nearest documented 1984–1988 repression location. I then average the distances for the schools in each municipality and take the logarithm of that municipal mean. A larger value therefore indicates that the municipality's school network lies farther, on average, from documented repression.

The registry does not report a reliable foundation year for every school. I therefore exclude all schools whose names identify them as part of the Millennium Schools or Replica Schools, the two principal school construction programs introduced under Correa. Each program comprised several schools; the labels do not refer to only two individual schools. The maintained assumption is that, after these exclusions, the distribution of the remaining schools reasonably approximates the network in place before the 2006 election. I do not claim to observe the foundation date of every remaining school. The historical component of the instrument is predetermined, while the school network component rests on this stated approximation. The robustness section examines whether the instrument instead captures baseline public service provision.

3.5. Municipal transfers

I use data from Mejia Acosta and Meneses (2019) on central government transfers to municipalities. The analysis focuses on capital transfers, which leave more scope for political discretion

[5] In Quito and Guayaquil, for example, commonly reported locations included the Servicio de Investigación Criminal de Pichincha (SIC-P) and Cuartel Modelo, respectively.

than transfers based on formulas. These annual data provide a second measure of municipal resource allocation and a more precise timeline around Correa's entry into office.

3.6. Additional variables

Historical municipal indicators come from Larrea (1992) and cover at most 123 municipalities. They include public sector workers as a share of the economically active population in 1982, the land Gini in 1974, the share of holdings smaller than one hectare in 1974, land affected by agrarian reform between 1974 and 1984, land per rural worker in 1974, and rural population growth between 1974 and 1982. I use 2001 nighttime light intensity from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), specifically its National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), as a measure of baseline local economic activity. I calculate mean light intensity within each municipality and normalize it by the maximum value across municipalities. I also use the 2006 waves of Latinobarómetro and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to examine political perceptions at the time of Correa's first election (Latinobarómetro Corporation, 2006; LAPOP Lab, 2006).

3.7. Final data set

The main sample contains 213 municipalities with consistent census, electoral, geographic, and control data. I exclude the Insular region and municipalities created after the 2001 census when their earlier boundaries cannot be reconstructed consistently.[6] I also exclude La Concordia. It was recorded as a zone without defined boundaries in 2001, assigned to Esmeraldas in 2007, and transferred to Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas in 2013. These changes prevent a stable geographic match across the census and election years used in the analysis. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics.

[6] The municipalities created after 2001 and excluded from the main analysis are Camilo Ponce Enríquez, Paquisha, Quinsaloma, and Tiwintza.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	mean	sd	min	max	count
Bureaucracy 2010 per 1,000 inhabitants	4.06	2.50	0.63	15.78	213
Bureaucracy 2001 per 1,000 inhabitants	2.97	2.13	0.63	13.35	213
Growth of bureaucracy 2001-2010	54.13	75.53	-35.21	567.38	213
Vote share	19.81	8.86	5.09	49.75	213
Log distance. Repression to nearest school	4.14	0.61	2.06	5.30	213
Log distance to Quito	5.35	0.69	0.00	6.28	213
Log distance to Guayaquil	5.20	0.64	0.00	6.29	213
Log distance to Cuenca	5.08	0.72	0.00	6.18	213
Population growth 2001-2010	0.21	0.15	-0.48	0.74	213
Vote share in local elections	27.82	15.19	0.00	85.33	213
Migration share, 1998	0.96	0.89	0.00	5.33	213
Night lights 2001	0.09	0.12	0.00	1.00	213
Latitude	-1.78	1.41	-4.85	1.00	213
Longitude	-79.09	0.95	-80.92	-75.88	213
Log of bureaucracy in 2001	0.88	0.64	-0.47	2.59	213
Gini in 1974	0.71	0.15	0.17	0.93	123
Bureaucracy in 1982	2.67	1.25	0.69	7.15	120
log capital transfers 2006	14.69	0.79	12.51	18.73	211
log capital transfers 2007	14.96	0.77	13.54	18.87	213
log capital transfers 2008	15.18	0.76	13.77	18.96	213
log capital transfers 2009	15.04	0.78	13.63	19.12	212
log capital transfers 2010	15.38	0.81	13.71	19.35	213

Note: Observation counts differ because historical variables and annual transfer records are not available for every municipality. Municipal boundary changes also prevent some observations from being matched consistently across years.


3.8. Descriptive overview of the main outcome and independent variables

3.8.1. Bureaucracy


The censuses record a national increase in bureaucracy between 2001 and 2010, an interval that ends during Correa's first term but begins before his entry into national politics. Figure 4 describes its geographic distribution. Panel (a) shows the national increase, and panel (b) separates municipalities where Correa placed first in 2006 from those where he did not. Bureaucracy grew by 36% overall and by 41% in municipalities that Correa won. Panel (c) maps growth in bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants. Growth was especially pronounced in the southern Highlands and the northwestern Amazon.

Figure 4: Allocation of bureaucracy (per 1,000 inhabitants)


(a) Increase in bureaucracy



(b) Increase in bureaucracy by whether Correa placed first



(c) Spatial distribution of bureaucracy growth (2001–2010)




Note: Bureaucracy is the number of bureaucrats per 1,000 municipal residents.

3.8.2. Vote share

Ecuador has four natural regions: Coast, Highlands, Amazon, and Insular. Most of the population lives in the Coast and Highlands, which have competed for political influence since the foundation of the republic (Ayala Mora, 2008; Hurtado, 2010). Correa's 2006 support was strongest in the Highlands, as Figure 5 shows.

Figure 5: Correa's vote share in 2006



4. Empirical strategy

The research design uses the geography of repression during the conflict between the government and subversive groups in 1984–1988. I present the OLS and IV models, state the conditional independence and exclusion assumptions, and evaluate their plausibility with historical and quantitative evidence.

4.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

I estimate the baseline regressions by OLS:

$$\begin{aligned} Bureaucracy_{i,2010} &= \alpha + \beta_{OLS} VoteShare_{i,2006} + \delta X_{i,j} + \gamma_r + \epsilon_i \\ BureaucracyGrowth_{i,2001-2010} &= \alpha + \beta_{OLS} VoteShare_{i,2006} + \delta X_{i,j} + \gamma_r + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $Bureaucracy_{i,2010}$ denotes bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality i in 2010. $BureaucracyGrowth_{i,2001-2010}$ denotes the growth rate of municipal bureaucracy between the 2001 and 2010 censuses. $X_{i,j}$ contains the controls described below, γ_r denotes fixed effects for

natural regions, and ϵ_i is the error term. The subscript $j = \{2001, 2009\}$ allows the controls to vary across specifications according to their measurement year.

Correa took office in January 2007, so most of the 2001–2010 measurement interval precedes his presidency. The growth outcome cannot assign the full observed change to his administration. Ecuador experienced fiscal austerity before his election (Conaghan, 2011), but the census data do not show when each municipality expanded its bureaucracy within the interval. I therefore complement the growth outcome with the 2010 level and, in the robustness section, condition that level directly on its 2001 value.

4.2. Controls

The controls capture geographic, demographic, economic, and political differences across municipalities. Most are predetermined relative to Correa's 2006 election. Two variables are measured later: population growth between 2001 and 2010 and the 2009 subnational vote share for Correa's party and allied parties. I include them in the full specification because the 2010 census measures the bureaucracy outcomes after both developments. They capture changes in municipal size and local political alignment that may shape the demand for, and allocation of, public employment by the time of the census.

Their timing requires caution. Population growth spans the outcome period, and the 2009 vote follows Correa's initial election and most of his first term. I therefore report the results sequentially with predetermined controls only, after adding population growth, and after adding the 2009 political control. This sequence shows whether the estimates depend on either variable measured later.

Geographic variables: Using INEC geographic data, I calculate each municipality's distance to Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca and enter these distances in logarithms. Quito is the national capital, Guayaquil is the principal port and largest coastal city, and Cuenca is a major center in the southern Highlands. Proximity to these cities may capture differences in state presence and access to economic activity (Fergusson et al., 2020). I also control for municipal latitude and longitude.

Population growth 2001-2010: I calculate log population growth from the 2001 and 2010 national censuses. Municipal growth changes both the scale of local labor markets and the demand for public services and employment. The variable spans the same period as bureaucracy growth, so I include it in the full specification but exclude it from the specification with predetermined

controls.

Vote share in 2009 local elections: Alianza PAIS had no municipal representation when Correa first ran in 2006. In the 2009 elections, the movement and its allies won local offices and established a subnational presence. Their municipal vote share captures local political alignment before the 2010 census measures bureaucracy and may account for greater access to public employment under politically aligned local governments. Because this vote follows Correa's election and may itself respond to developments during his first term, I add it only in the full specification. I do not use Correa's 2009 presidential vote as a control because it is a subsequent electoral outcome.[7]

Number of bureaucrats in 2001: I include the log of the number of bureaucrats in 2001 as a control for all regressions.

Migration in 1998: The 2001 census records whether household members migrated abroad and the year in which they left. Emigration rose after the 1998 financial crisis, especially in urban areas. I control for emigrants as a share of the municipal labor force.

Night lights in 2001: I use average nighttime light intensity from NOAA's NCEI as a proxy for baseline local economic activity. I calculate the municipal mean and normalize it by the maximum value across municipalities.

Region fixed effects: The specifications include fixed effects for the Coast, Highlands, and Amazon.[8] These natural regions are Ecuador's durable geographic divisions. They differ in climate, settlement history, economic structure, social composition, and political development. Their historical importance extends beyond physical geography: regional divisions have shaped the country's social organization, political identities, and competition for national influence (Ayala Mora, 2008). The Amazon, for example, experienced substantial settlement following the land reforms that began in the 1960s. Natural region boundaries remain stable across the historical periods used in the analysis, while provincial boundaries and assignments changed during the period covered by the data.[9]

Region fixed effects absorb broad and persistent differences across Ecuador's principal geographic, social, and political settings while retaining municipal variation relevant to a national government's allocation decisions. The estimates therefore compare municipalities within the

[7] The local measure includes candidates who ran in electoral alliance with Correa's party.

[8] The Insular region, comprising the Galápagos Islands, is excluded because of its small population and geographic separation from continental Ecuador.

[9] Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas and Santa Elena became provinces in 2007. La Concordia also changed administrative status and provincial assignment, which is why the analysis excludes it.

same natural region after conditioning on the listed municipal characteristics.

4.3. The instrument: Average school distance to repression

Section 2 describes the conflict between the Febres-Cordero government and subversive organizations, particularly Alfaro Vive Carajo. The conflict produced geographically concentrated abuses, including the Restrepo and Taura cases, that remained politically salient and later became part of Correa's criticism of the traditional establishment (Ayala Mora, 2008; Freidenberg and Pachano, 2016; Hurtado, 2010).

The instrument does not measure violence in general. It measures the log municipal mean of the distance calculated for each school. The expected first stage sign is negative: municipalities whose school networks lie closer, on average, to documented repression should provide greater support to Correa in 2006.

The mechanism connects local political memory to Correa's outsider appeal. Repression under Febres-Cordero generated grievances against the traditional political establishment. Schools are long-lived community institutions where families, teachers, students, and other residents interact, so proximity to schools provides a geographic proxy for settings in which those experiences could remain locally salient and pass across generations. Correa entered the 2006 election without an established party organization and attacked the traditional political system in explicitly anti-establishment and human-rights terms. His campaign could therefore activate grievances that were more salient where the school network lay closer to documented repression. This is an argument about local memory and outsider mobilization, not a claim that repression mechanically produced left-wing ideology.

The empirical strategy follows the broader logic of Bautista et al. (2021), who show how the geography of repression can shape later political behavior through differences in local exposure and information. The Ecuadorian mechanism, however, does not rest on that citation alone. It rests on the political use of the Febres-Cordero record, the local role assigned to schools, and the conditional identifying assumption stated below. Related evidence that schools can influence political information and voting supports their role as community settings (Berger et al., 2008; Ajzenman and Durante, 2022).

4.4. Instrumental variable (IV) model

I estimate the model by two-stage least squares; it is just identified. Let Z_i denote the log average distance of public schools in municipality i to their nearest documented repression location. The first stage is

$$VoteShare_{i,2006} = \theta + \pi Z_i + X_i'\delta + \gamma_r + u_i, \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Bureaucracy_{i,2010} &= \alpha + \beta_{IV}\widehat{VoteShare}_{i,2006} + X_i'\delta + \gamma_r + \epsilon_i \\ BureaucracyGrowth_{i,2001-2010} &= \alpha + \beta_{IV}\widehat{VoteShare}_{i,2006} + X_i'\delta + \gamma_r + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where X_i contains the municipal controls and γ_r denotes region fixed effects. The first stage asks whether average school distance to repression predicts Correa's initial vote share. The expected coefficient π is negative. Under the assumptions stated below, Equation 3 links the vote share predicted by the first stage to the level and growth of bureaucracy.

The geographic interpretation follows from γ_r. The IV estimates use differences among municipalities within the same natural region, conditional on the covariates. This scale matches the empirical question because a national government allocates resources across municipalities. For each public school, I calculate the distance to the nearest documented repression location without regard to province. The proposed diffusion of local memory through schools need not stop at an administrative border. The estimates can therefore compare municipalities in different provinces within the same natural region without comparing the Coast, Highlands, and Amazon with one another. They do not establish that the same relationship can be identified using only differences among municipalities within each province. The robustness section reports that stricter comparison.

The main estimates use Huber–White robust standard errors for the municipal cross section. Appendix Table A8 reports the IV estimates with spatial standard errors following Conley (1999).

4.5. Conditional independence, relevance, and exclusion

Following Bautista et al. (2021), I frame instrument exogeneity through a *conditional independence assumption*. I do not assume that the instrument is unconditionally random. Observed historical and geographic characteristics may jointly predict the instrument and the outcome,

so the specification conditions on those differences. After conditioning on predetermined municipal characteristics, geographic controls, baseline state presence, and region fixed effects, the instrument's remaining variation must be as good as randomly assigned with respect to other determinants of bureaucratic expansion after the election. This is the empirical logic of conditioning: characteristics that may matter are included in the model rather than required to be unconditionally balanced.

The alternative explanation of persistent ideology motivates a direct test of *conditional political balance*. I use the 1988 presidential vote shares of the right-wing PSC and the center-left ID, the difference between their vote shares, and an indicator for whether the PSC won the municipality. I also use Gutiérrez's 2002 vote share to test whether the instrument predicts support for another anti-establishment candidate. Conditional on the predetermined controls and region fixed effects, the instrument predicts none of these outcomes, and a joint test does not distinguish the four 1988 political measures from zero. Adding the PSC and ID vote shares to the IV specification also leaves the bureaucracy growth estimate almost unchanged in the common sample of 148 municipalities. Appendix Table A2 reports these results. The exercise provides direct evidence against the interpretation that the instrument merely separates historically left- and right-leaning municipalities.

The broader historical exercise applies the same conditional logic to socioeconomic differences measured before the repression period. Figure 8 identifies the older characteristics correlated with the instrument, and Appendix Table A11 includes them directly as controls. Historical coverage reduces the sample to 121 municipalities, but the bureaucracy growth estimate remains positive and precise. The political balance and historical control exercises show that the main relationship survives conditioning on the observed historical differences most relevant to the design.

The IV interpretation also requires relevance and exclusion. Relevance means that the instrument predicts Correa's 2006 vote share conditional on the same controls. Figure 6 first shows the unconditional relationship. The regression tables report the conditional first stage and the Kleibergen–Paap statistic. Exclusion requires average school distance to repression to affect later bureaucracy only through Correa's initial support, after conditioning on the included covariates. This restriction cannot be tested directly. I assess its plausibility with predetermined political balance, baseline public service, and historical control exercises reported below and in the appendix.


A potential violation would arise if Correa promised school or healthcare spending specifically in municipalities close to documented repression, thereby raising both votes and later resources. The dependent variable does not count teachers, physicians, nurses, or total public employment. It counts clerical and office workers in public administration, so such promises would affect the outcome only if they also induced clerical hiring in public administration in the same municipalities. I cannot observe a complete record of campaign promises for each municipality and therefore cannot rule out that path directly. The baseline service tests nevertheless show that the instrument does not predict 2001 school availability, healthcare employment, or other public services. Appendix Table A3 reports these tests and the corresponding IV sensitivity estimates. Adding these measures leaves the bureaucracy growth estimate similar. These results make the alternative based on spending promises less direct, but they do not prove exclusion.

Figure 6: Vote share for Correa in 2006 and distance to repression locations



Figure 7 provides separate contextual evidence that emblematic cases from the Febres-Cordero period remained politically salient under Correa. Searches for these cases rose around the period of constitutional reform and then declined. Because these searches and the Truth Commission postdate the 2006 election, I do not use them to establish conditional independence or exclusion. They show only that Correa's government later returned publicly to the historical episodes that motivate the proposed channel of local memory. The more direct empirical checks use outcomes measured before Correa entered national politics. These include the 1988 political balance exercises and the 2002 Gutiérrez placebo reported in the robustness section.

Figure 7: Google Trends: Selected cases before and after institutional change



Note: This figure plots Google Trends scores for the topics shown in the legend.

If schools helped diffuse information, younger cohorts need not be more distrustful of political parties everywhere. Age gradients may reflect broader regional patterns in Latin America. The more informative test is whether the age gap in distrust is larger where repression occurred closer to schools. I use the 2006 Ecuador Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro Corporation, 2006) and the 2006 Americas Barometer (LAPOP Lab, 2006) and match respondents to the municipal measure of repression proximity.


In both datasets, the interaction between belonging to the younger cohort and proximity to repression episodes near schools is positive and precise. Younger cohorts are less trusting of political parties in municipalities where repression occurred closer to schools. I treat this evidence as suggestive corroboration rather than a definitive test because the merged samples cover only 45 municipalities in Latinobarómetro and 64 in the Americas Barometer. Appendix Figures A3 and A4 report the estimates and additional details.

The available characteristics measured before the repression period come from Larrea (1992), who compiled municipal measures from the 1974 agricultural census and the 1982 population census. These data cover at most 123 of the 213 municipalities in the main sample. They include public employment in 1982, the 1974 land Gini, the share of holdings smaller than one hectare, land affected by agrarian reform, land per rural worker, and rural population growth between

1974 and 1982.

Figure 8 reports the conditional relationship between the instrument and each characteristic. The instrument predicts the share of small landholdings and rural population growth, while the other estimates are imprecise. I therefore do not claim universal historical balance. The main specifications condition on predetermined municipal and geographic differences available for the full sample. The robustness section then adds the older characteristics available for the smaller historical sample. The separate political balance tests address the narrower claim that the instrument does not proxy persistent left–right orientation.

Figure 8: Predetermined municipal characteristics and the instrument



Note: The figure reports the relationship between the instrument and the available municipal characteristics measured in 1974 or 1982.

5. Estimates: Initial electoral support for an outsider and bureaucracy, 2001–2010

Correa's 2006 vote share is positively associated with both bureaucracy outcomes in every OLS specification. Table 2 first reports estimates using predetermined controls only. The next columns add population growth between 2001 and 2010 and the 2009 subnational vote share for Correa's party and allied parties. The coefficient changes little across the three columns for each outcome. The table also reports the sample size, mean of the dependent variable, R^2, and adjusted R^2.

The columns with all controls remain my preferred substantive specifications. The 2010 census measures the outcomes after municipal population growth and local political alignment may

have shaped bureaucratic employment. These variables are not predetermined relative to the 2006 vote. The sequential columns show that the positive relationship does not arise from conditioning on either variable measured later.

Table 2: OLS model

	N. Bureaucrats 2010			G. Bureaucrats 01–10		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote share in 2006	0.052***	0.051***	0.053***	2.571***	2.536***	2.675***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.712)	(0.712)	(0.723)
Observations	213	213	213	213	213	213
Predetermined controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population growth, 2001–2010	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
2009 subnational Alianza PAIS/allied vote share	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dependent variable	4.06	4.06	4.06	54.13	54.13	54.13
Variation with respect to mean (%)	1.28	1.25	1.30	4.75	4.69	4.94
R^2	0.726	0.730	0.734	0.383	0.387	0.415
Adjusted R^2	0.711	0.713	0.717	0.350	0.350	0.377

Note: N. Bureaucrats 2010 = Number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants. G. Bureaucrats 01-10 = Growth rate of the number of bureaucrats from 2001 to 2010. Columns (1) and (4) include predetermined controls only. Columns (2) and (5) add population growth. Columns (3) and (6) further add the 2009 subnational Alianza PAIS/allied vote share. Vote shares refer to the votes received by Correa in the first round of that election year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For a description of the control variables, see the main text.

Table 3 presents the instrumental variable results. Panel A reports the reduced form, which relates the school network distance directly to bureaucracy without first passing through Correa's 2006 vote share. Its negative sign means that municipalities whose schools lay closer, on average, to documented repression had more clerks in public administration in 2010 and greater growth in clerical employment between the censuses. This coefficient has the same sign as the first stage, in which shorter distance predicts greater Correa support. Under the conditional independence and exclusion assumptions, Panel B combines these relationships to obtain the conditional IV estimate linking Correa's initial vote share to bureaucracy.

The IV estimates retain a positive and economically meaningful magnitude across all three control sets. A difference of one percentage point in Correa's vote share corresponds to estimated bureaucracy growth of about 5–6% of the outcome mean. The first stage remains strong in every column. Because the specifications include fixed effects for natural regions, the estimates compare municipalities within Ecuador's natural regions rather than comparing one region with another.

The IV estimates are not uniformly precise. The growth estimate is marginally precise with predetermined controls and more precise in the full specification, while the estimates for the 2010 level are weaker. Stricter baseline and geographic comparisons also reduce precision. I therefore treat the estimates as conditional evidence. Their strength lies in their stable positive sign and

economic magnitude, not in a claim of definitive causality. They concern changes in a continuous vote share induced by the continuous distance measure; I do not interpret them as the effect of belonging to a binary group with high support.

Tables 2 and 3 report the coefficients of interest, indicators for the controls, and model fit statistics. Appendix Table A4 reports every named control coefficient and standard error for the complete OLS, first stage, reduced form, and IV specifications. It also reports their fit statistics and the Kleibergen–Paap first stage statistic. Appendix Table A8 reports the corresponding estimates using Conley standard errors. The main specifications use the same sample of 213 municipalities described in Section 3.

Table 3: Instrumental variables model

	N. Bureaucrats 2010			G. Bureaucrats 01–10		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Reduced form						
Distance: repression to nearest school (log)	-0.231	-0.259	-0.269*	-14.990*	-15.884*	-16.713**
	(0.165)	(0.163)	(0.159)	(8.706)	(8.414)	(8.181)
Panel B: IV estimates						
Vote share in 2006	0.044	0.048	0.050*	2.842*	2.962*	3.134**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(1.590)	(1.521)	(1.486)
Observations	213	213	213	213	213	213
Predetermined controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population growth, 2001–2010	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
2009 subnational Alianza PAIS/allied vote share	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic	37.51	39.00	38.37	37.51	39.00	38.37
First-stage R^2	0.477	0.482	0.484	0.477	0.482	0.484
First-stage adjusted R^2	0.448	0.451	0.450	0.448	0.451	0.450
Reduced-form R^2	0.707	0.713	0.716	0.338	0.344	0.368
Reduced-form adjusted R^2	0.691	0.695	0.697	0.301	0.305	0.327
Mean dependent variable	4.06	4.06	4.06	54.13	54.13	54.13
Variation with respect to mean (%)	1.08	1.19	1.24	5.25	5.47	5.79

Note: N. Bureaucrats 2010 = Number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants. G. Bureaucrats 01-10 = Growth rate of the number of bureaucrats from 2001 to 2010. Columns (1) and (4) include predetermined controls only. Columns (2) and (5) add population growth. Columns (3) and (6) further add the 2009 subnational Alianza PAIS/allied vote share. Vote shares refer to the votes received by Correa in the first round of that election year. The instrument is the logarithm of the municipal average of each public school's distance to its nearest documented repression location. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For a description of the control variables, see the main text.

5.1. Nonlinearities in electoral support and targeting of high support municipalities

The categorical evidence shows that bureaucracy growth was concentrated in municipalities where Correa received high initial support. I divide his 2006 municipal vote share into terciles with low, middle, and high support. These categories measure support intensity; they do not identify swing voters or electoral pivotality.


Appendix Table A1 reports categorical OLS regressions with the tercile of low support as the omitted group. Column (1) includes predetermined controls, population growth, and the

2009 subnational vote share for Correa's party and allied parties. Column (2) excludes the 2009 vote share. In both specifications, municipalities with middle support resemble those with low support. Municipalities with high support experience substantially greater bureaucracy growth, and the equality of the high and middle support coefficients is rejected. The concentration in municipalities with high support does not depend on the 2009 political control.

Figure 9 shows the corresponding visual pattern after partialling out all controls and region fixed effects. The relationship appears stronger among municipalities with high support. Formal comparisons of the slopes within the three terciles are imprecise, however, and do not reject equal slopes. The regression evidence in Appendix Table A1 establishes a difference for the high support category, not a statistically distinct slope within each group.

This categorical exercise is descriptive OLS evidence, not a separate causal IV estimate. Its interpretation fits the political context. Before 2006, Alianza PAIS had no legislative or local political presence, and Correa entered national politics without an established territorial party machine. Directing bureaucratic employment toward municipalities with high support could help build the local organization that the movement initially lacked. The transfer results point to a different margin: capital transfers respond more to whether Correa won a municipality, whereas bureaucratic appointments are concentrated where his initial support was high. The two distributive instruments therefore appear to have operated through different political margins.

Figure 9: Correa's 2006 vote share and bureaucracy growth across support groups



Note: The figure plots residualized growth in bureaucrats per capita between 2001 and 2010 against Correa's 2006 vote share after partialling out all controls and region fixed effects. The vertical dashed lines separate terciles with low, middle, and high support. The lines are separate descriptive fits within each tercile. The visual pattern is consistent with the differences reported in Appendix Table A1, but formal tests do not reject equal slopes across the three groups.

5.2. Robustness checks

Placebo election: Lucio Gutiérrez. Gutiérrez entered the 2002 election as a former military officer who presented himself as an alternative to the traditional parties. His anti-establishment appeal makes his first-round vote share a useful placebo outcome. Table 4 reports a direct regression of Gutiérrez's vote share on the instrument, predetermined controls, and region fixed effects. The instrument does not predict his support and therefore does not appear to be a general predictor of support for every candidate who campaigns against the political establishment. The placebo uses the same sample of 213 municipalities as the main analysis.

Table 4: Placebo election: Lucio Gutiérrez

	Gutiérrez vote share, 2002
Distance: repression to nearest school (log)	0.404
	(1.303)
Observations	213
Predetermined controls	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes
R^2	0.614
Adjusted R^2	0.593

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Note: The dependent variable is Gutiérrez's first-round vote share in 2002. The reported coefficient is on the instrument used for Correa's 2006 vote share. The regression uses the same sample of 213 municipalities as the main analysis. For a description of the controls, see the main text.

Conditional political balance. Persistent ideology would threaten the design if the instrument merely separated historically left- and right-leaning municipalities. I examine this possibility using the 1988 presidential vote shares of the PSC and the ID. The PSC was the right-wing party associated with Febres-Cordero, while the ID was the established center-left alternative that won the 1988 election. I digitized the municipal returns by hand from *Estadísticas electorales del Ecuador 1978–1989* (Darlić, 1987). The resulting data cover 148 municipalities; I could not locate comparable municipal returns for the 1990s.

Appendix Table A2 shows that, conditional on the predetermined controls and region fixed effects, the instrument does not predict PSC support, ID support, the difference between their vote shares, or whether the PSC won the municipality. A joint test does not reject zero, even though PSC and ID support jointly predict Correa's 2006 vote share. The null relationship between the instrument and prior orientation is therefore informative. The Gutiérrez placebo provides complementary evidence from 2002.

The same table estimates the bureaucracy growth IV on the common sample of 148 munici-

palities. Adding the PSC and ID vote shares leaves the estimated magnitude nearly unchanged. The estimate becomes less precise, but the comparison within the same sample shows that controlling for earlier political orientation does not explain the main result. I describe this evidence as conditional political balance: after conditioning on the observed predetermined characteristics, the instrument does not separate municipalities by their available prior political outcomes.

Baseline public services. The instrument does not directly measure the number of schools, teachers, healthcare workers, or users of public services. Its construction nevertheless uses school locations, so the availability of public services at baseline is a relevant alternative explanation. Appendix Table A3 shows that the instrument does not individually predict the available 2001 measures of school availability, healthcare employment, military employment, electricity access, or water access. Adding school availability alone or the full set of baseline services leaves the bureaucracy growth IV estimate positive and similar in magnitude. These results reduce the possibility that the instrument simply captures public services that existed before 2006 or demand for public employment. They do not verify individual school foundation dates or rule out all unobserved differences.

Dropping the capital. Quito contains a large share of the national bureaucracy. The main specification controls for distance to Quito, and Appendix Table A9 shows that excluding the capital does not change the substantive result.

Bureaucracy before treatment. Appendix Table A10 replaces the outcomes with bureaucracy measured in 2001, before Correa's candidacy. The estimate is imprecise, which weighs against an interpretation based on municipal bureaucracy that existed before his candidacy.

Historical controls. Figure 8 shows that the instrument predicts the share of small landholdings in 1974 and rural population growth between 1974 and 1982. Table A11 adds these measures as controls. Their limited coverage reduces the sample to 121 municipalities. The bureaucracy growth estimate remains positive and precise, while the estimate for the 2010 level remains positive but becomes imprecise. This exercise conditions directly on the observed historical differences, and the main growth result survives.

Controlling for the 2001 level and province fixed effects. The main specifications already control for the log number of bureaucrats in 2001. Appendix Table A5 instead estimates bureaucracy per 1,000 residents in 2010 conditional on the same measure in 2001. The OLS relationship remains positive and precise. The IV estimate also remains positive: if Correa's initial support differs by ten percentage points, the estimate corresponds to about 0.34 additional bureaucrats

per 1,000 residents in 2010, roughly 8% of the outcome mean. The estimate is imprecise, however. The first stage remains strong, but the 2001 level closely predicts the 2010 level and weakens the reduced form relationship. The linked census and electoral records contain 213 geographically comparable municipalities. With this sample, specifications that absorb more baseline or geographic variation have limited power. I report the uncertainty directly and do not treat this alternative IV estimate as conclusive.

Appendix Table A6 then replaces the three natural region effects with indicators for the 23 mainland provinces represented in the sample. Province size ranges from one to 25 municipalities, and the indicators alone absorb about 63% of the instrument's variation. The OLS coefficient for the 2010 bureaucracy level remains almost unchanged and precise. The bureaucracy growth coefficient retains its positive sign but becomes smaller and imprecise. Once province effects remove the component that varies among provinces, the remaining instrument variation predicts Correa's vote share weakly. Figure A1 displays this narrower conditional variation. I report the resulting IV coefficients for transparency but do not interpret their magnitude or direction.

Province effects absorb political orientation, administrative capacity, geography, and every other difference among provinces at once. The weak first stage therefore does not reveal which component accounts for the absorbed variation. The historical political balance tests provide a more direct check of political orientation: conditional on the municipal controls and natural region effects, the instrument does not predict earlier support for the PSC, the ID, or Gutiérrez. Reconstructing the provinces that existed before Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas and Santa Elena became provinces in 2007 produces the same conclusion of a weak first stage. The main IV estimates use municipal variation within Ecuador's natural regions, the preferred scale for the national allocation question and the country's persistent geographic divisions. The data do not support a separately identified comparison within provinces, and I state this limitation throughout the paper.

6. Municipal transfers


Annual records of capital transfers provide a complementary outcome and a clearer temporal window around the outsider's entry into office. Institutional rules and allocation formulas constrain these transfers more than bureaucratic appointments, so transfers need not respond proportionally to each additional percentage point of vote share. The more relevant political margin may be whether the outsider established territorial control in a municipality. I there-

fore study transfers through a difference in differences design with municipality and year fixed effects, based on whether Correa won the municipality in 2006. This approach is especially relevant after the 2008 constitutional reform increased executive discretion and centralized budget decisions.

I use capital transfer data to examine whether distributive politics under outsider rule extended beyond bureaucratic appointments. Capital transfers are more open to political discretion than other categories of intergovernmental transfers (Mejia Acosta and Meneses, 2019).

Figure 10 plots transfers per capita to municipalities where Correa placed first (*win06=1*) and where he placed second or lower (*win06=0*) in the first round of the 2006 presidential election. Transfers rose sharply during 2008–2009 in municipalities that Correa won, even where his party had no local candidate.

Figure 10: Capital transfers per capita



Note: This figure plots central government capital transfers to municipalities per capita, using the 2010 population. *win06=1* denotes municipalities where Correa placed first in the first round of the 2006 presidential election; *win06=0* denotes municipalities where he placed second or lower.

To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following fixed effects model:


$$log(CapitalTransfersPC + 1)_{i,t} = \eta_i + \lambda_t + \beta_{i,t} win06_i \times year_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{4}$$

where the dependent variable is nominal central government capital transfers per capita.[10]

[10] Ecuador is a dollarized economy, so nominal and real values are nearly identical over this short period.

Capital transfers finance investment, including infrastructure, and allow the central government more discretion than other transfer categories (Mejia Acosta and Meneses, 2019). Subscript i indexes municipalities and t indexes years. The indicator *win06* equals one if Correa placed first in municipality i in the first round of the 2006 presidential election. The year indicators cover 2003–2010, with 2006 as the reference year. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Figure 11 plots the interaction coefficients. They become positive and precisely estimated in 2008 and 2009, when the government promoted and approved the new constitution through a referendum.

Figure 11: Capital transfers to municipalities during institutional change



Note: The figure plots estimates from Model (4). *Win06* equals one when Correa placed first in a municipality. Each dot represents the interaction between *win06* and a year indicator.

These results provide complementary evidence consistent with tactical redistribution toward municipalities that initially supported the outsider. The pattern is strongest while the government promoted and approved the new constitution, when popular backing for institutional change was especially valuable. The stronger transfer estimates after 2008 are consistent with constitutional reform and budget centralization expanding the executive's capacity to favor aligned municipalities through discretionary fiscal channels.


I also estimate yearly instrumental variable specifications for capital transfers using the same instrument and controls as in the bureaucracy analysis. The first stage remains strong throughout, but the second stage coefficients after the election are positive and imprecisely estimated, while the 2001 placebo is null. I do not interpret this evidence as showing that each additional percentage point of outsider support translated proportionally into greater transfers. Instead,

the contrast with the bureaucracy results suggests that the two patronage instruments operated differently: bureaucratic appointments responded more continuously to the intensity of electoral support, whereas capital transfers were more closely linked to the threshold of territorial political alignment. Appendix Figure A2 presents this result.

6.1. Resource allocation and subsequent electoral support

The later election exercise first documents how Correa's municipal coalition changed and then asks whether resource allocation tracked its persistence. Figure 12 compares Correa's signed vote margin in 2006 with his margins in 2009 and 2013. A positive margin means that Correa placed first in the municipality, while a negative margin means that another candidate placed first. In each later election, Correa retained 54 of the 55 municipalities he had won in 2006. By 2009, he also placed first in 104 municipalities that he had initially lost. By 2013, that number had risen to 140. The figure shows both the retention of Correa's initial municipal victories and the territorial expansion of his coalition.

Figure 12: The expansion of Correa's municipal electoral coalition, 2006–2013



Note: Each point represents a municipality. The signed vote margin equals Correa's vote share minus the vote share of the strongest rival candidate. Positive values indicate that Correa placed first in the municipality. The horizontal and vertical lines mark a zero vote margin. The upper left quadrant contains municipalities that Correa lost in 2006 but won in the later election; the upper right quadrant contains municipalities that he won in both elections. The figure reports raw electoral patterns without controls. Vote share denominators include votes for all presidential candidates and null votes but exclude blank votes.

The figure describes the expansion of Correa's electoral coalition but does not identify its causes. Bureaucracy growth spans 2001–2010 and therefore cannot explain the April 2009 elec-

tion cleanly. For that election, I instead use the change in capital transfers during 2007–2008, before votes were cast. Table 5 reports the results.

Panel A relates the transfer change before the election to Correa's 2009 presidential vote share. The transfer measure is the average log real capital transfer per capita in 2007–2008 relative to its 2006 level. Municipalities receiving larger increases subsequently gave Correa greater support in 2009, conditional on his initial 2006 vote share, predetermined municipal characteristics, and region fixed effects. The region effects absorb broad shifts across Ecuador's principal geographic regions.

Panel B documents strong persistence through the 2013 election.[11] Municipalities that supported Correa more heavily in 2009 continued to do so in 2013, even after conditioning on his 2006 vote share. Panel C asks whether resource allocation predicts additional support in 2013. Bureaucracy growth does not. Transfers during 2007–2010 are positively associated with the 2013 vote when the model conditions on 2006 support but not the 2009 vote. Adding the 2009 vote makes the transfer coefficient smaller and imprecise, while the 2009 vote remains strongly associated with the 2013 vote. Transfer changes between 2008 and 2010 also do not predict additional support in 2013.

This sequence is consistent with an early transfer channel: municipalities receiving larger transfer increases gave Correa greater support by 2009, and that geographic pattern persisted through 2013. It does not show that bureaucratic expansion or transfers after 2009 generated further electoral gains. I treat these regressions as descriptive because resource allocation was not randomly assigned. Nor do I use the repression instrument for spending in these equations. Historical political memory could affect Correa's later vote directly, which would make the exclusion restriction inappropriate for that purpose.

7. Conclusions

This paper provides a careful account of how an electoral outsider without an inherited party machine translated an initial electoral geography into an uneven expansion of the state. Institutionalized party systems usually channel political careers upward through existing organizations. Correa reversed that sequence. He won the presidency without an established party orga-

[11] Mejía Acosta and Meneses provided the capital transfer series used in Panels A and C, which begins in 2001 (Mejia Acosta and Meneses, 2019). Observation counts differ across columns because Ecuador's municipal map changed during the period. Parishes were promoted to municipalities, new municipalities were created, and some jurisdictions received new municipal or provincial codes after reassignment. These changes prevent a consistent match between every municipality and every annual transfer record.

Table 5: Resource allocation and subsequent electoral support

	(1) Correa share 2009	(2) Correa share 2013	(3) Correa share 2013	(4) Correa share 2013	(5) Correa share 2013	(6) Correa share 2013
Panel A: Early transfers and the 2009 election						
Transfer change, 2007–2008	6.678**					
	(2.753)					
Panel B: Persistence of electoral support						
Correa vote share, 2009		0.644***				
		(0.050)				
Panel C: Resources and the 2013 election						
Bureaucracy growth, 2001–2010			-0.001			
			(0.010)			
Transfer change, 2007–2010				6.974**	2.747	
				(2.727)	(2.315)	
Transfer change, 2008–2010						0.459
						(1.595)
Observations	211	213	213	211	211	213
Predetermined controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Correa vote share, 2006	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Correa vote share, 2009	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.604	0.779	0.779	0.586	0.779	0.779
Adjusted R^2	0.580	0.765	0.764	0.560	0.764	0.764

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Vote shares are measured in percentage points. Transfer variables use real capital transfers per capita.
The 2007–2008 and 2007–2010 measures are changes relative to the 2006 baseline.
The 2008–2010 measure reports the change between those years.
The 2013 share equals Correa votes divided by votes for all candidates plus null votes; blank votes are excluded.
Observation counts differ because boundary changes and data availability prevent matching every municipality to each annual transfer record.
All specifications are descriptive OLS regressions. $^{*}\ p < 0.10$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$.

nization or municipal representation and then built a durable national coalition while governing. His case makes visible the problem of constructing political organization downward from the exercise of national power.

Bureaucratic expansion was concentrated in municipalities with high initial support, a pattern consistent with building an outsider party. The later elections sharpen but also limit that interpretation. The census interval cannot test whether bureaucratic hiring generated Correa's 2009 support. Early transfer increases are associated with greater support in 2009, and that geographic pattern persists through 2013. Bureaucracy growth does not predict additional support in 2013. The transfer results therefore provide suggestive evidence consistent with early coalition consolidation. The data do not establish that bureaucratic hiring or capital transfers caused later electoral support.

The instrument uses the average distance between the school network and historical repression to predict Correa's initial support. The possibility that Correa's campaign activated locally rooted political memories motivates the first stage. The estimates compare municipalities within Ecuador's natural regions and rely on the stated conditional independence and exclusion assumptions. They retain a positive and economically meaningful magnitude across control sets but are not uniformly precise. The available measures of prior left–right orientation and baseline public services do not explain the relationship, yet the design cannot establish an informative IV

estimate using only variation within provinces.

The broader implication is that constitutional change and distributive politics need not proceed independently. Where parties are weakly institutionalized, an outsider may reach the top before building the organization needed to govern and remain electorally viable. Such a politician must construct territorial support from national office while pursuing institutional reform. Durable and locally embedded public resources may help turn alignment in a first election into political organization. Whether this process strengthens state capacity or instead produces political employment and resource misallocation remains an important question for future research.

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This is a solo-authored paper. The author declares that he was in charge of all stages of this research, including writing, data analysis, data curation, methodology, and editing.

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Appendix

A. Data sources and variables creation

A.1. Merging process between census and electoral data

The census and electoral files use incompatible administrative identifiers, so I construct a common municipal crosswalk. INEC codes administrative units hierarchically by province, municipality, and parish. Some codes changed between 2006 and 2010 after the creation of the provinces of Santa Elena and Santo Domingo.

I match each municipality to its 2010 identifier using its name and province. The province check distinguishes municipalities that share a name. I exclude the Insular region because the Galápagos Islands have a small population and are geographically separate from continental Ecuador.

Example:

Ecuador has 24 provinces and 221 municipalities. INEC assigns the province of Azuay the code "01" and its municipality of Cuenca the code "50." Combining the province and municipality codes gives Cuenca the identifier "0150."

This combined identifier distinguishes municipalities with the same name in different provinces. No two municipalities within the same province share a name.

Table A1: Bureaucracy growth across groups of electoral support in 2006

	Bureaucracy growth, 2001–2010	
	(1)	(2)
Middle-support municipality	5.626	4.661
	(8.239)	(7.968)
High-support municipality	46.046***	40.898***
	(14.866)	(14.249)
Observations	213	213
Predetermined controls	Yes	Yes
2001–2010 population growth	Yes	Yes
2009 subnational Alianza PAIS/allied vote share	Yes	No
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Mean dependent variable	54.13	54.13
R^2	0.405	0.373
Adjusted R^2	0.363	0.332
p-value: high support = middle support	0.001	0.002

OLS regressions. The omitted category is the tercile with low support.

Column (1) includes predetermined controls, population growth, and the 2009 subnational vote share.

Column (2) excludes the 2009 vote share.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Conditional political balance and stability of the IV estimate

	Coefficient	p-value	Observations	First-stage F
Panel A: Conditional political-balance tests				
PSC vote share, 1988	-1.594 (1.261)	0.208	148	
ID vote share, 1988	-1.542 (1.409)	0.276	148	
ID minus PSC vote share, 1988	0.052 (1.994)	0.979	148	
PSC victory, 1988	-0.011 (0.050)	0.821	148	
Gutiérrez vote share, 2002	0.404 (1.303)	0.757	213	
Panel B: Growth IV on the common historical sample				
Without PSC and ID controls	1.722 (1.302)	0.188	148	27.27
With PSC and ID controls	1.675 (1.402)	0.234	148	22.05

Panel A reports the coefficient on the log municipal mean of each school's distance to its nearest documented repression location.

Vote shares are measured in percentage points; PSC victory is an indicator.

Panel B reports the IV coefficient on Correa's 2006 first-round vote share.

All models condition on predetermined municipal characteristics, geographic controls, and region fixed effects.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3: Baseline public services and stability of the IV estimate

	Coefficient	p-value	Observations	First-stage F
Panel A: Conditional balance in baseline public services				
School availability, 2001	0.034	0.285	212	
	(0.032)			
Healthcare employment, 2001	0.002	0.380	212	
	(0.002)			
Military employment, 2001	-0.068	0.395	213	
	(0.080)			
Electricity access, 2001	-0.014	0.267	213	
	(0.013)			
Water access, 2001	-0.032	0.104	213	
	(0.019)			
Panel B: Bureaucracy-growth IV estimates				
Predetermined controls only	2.842	0.074	213	37.51
	(1.590)			
Add 2001 school availability	3.120	0.039	212	39.80
	(1.502)			
Add all baseline public services	3.127	0.068	212	38.67
	(1.703)			

Panel A reports the coefficient on the log municipal mean of each school's distance to its nearest documented repression location.
Panel B reports the IV coefficient on Correa's 2006 first-round vote share.
The dependent variable in Panel B is bureaucracy growth between 2001 and 2010.
All models include predetermined municipal controls and region fixed effects.
The complete set of baseline services contains the five 2001 outcomes reported in Panel A.
Observation counts differ because boundary changes and data availability prevent matching every municipality to each 2001 measure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4: Complete coefficients for the bureaucracy specification with all controls

	OLS		First stage	Reduced form		IV	
	Level 2010	Growth 01–10	Vote share 2006	Level 2010	Growth 01–10	Level 2010	Growth 01–10
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Vote share in 2006	0.053***	2.675***				0.050*	3.134**
	(0.012)	(0.723)				(0.029)	(1.486)
Distance: repression to nearest school (log)			-5.333***	-0.269*	-16.713**		
			(0.861)	(0.159)	(8.181)		
Distance to Quito (log)	-0.306	7.825	-0.670	-0.344*	6.597	-0.310	8.696
	(0.202)	(10.313)	(0.959)	(0.193)	(9.040)	(0.198)	(10.501)
Distance to Guayaquil (log)	-0.258	-0.943	5.254*	0.018	13.098	-0.247	-3.366
	(0.230)	(5.887)	(2.967)	(0.125)	(10.626)	(0.277)	(8.976)
Distance to Cuenca (log)	-0.095	7.053	-0.502	-0.121	5.827	-0.096	7.400
	(0.164)	(7.626)	(1.325)	(0.154)	(9.104)	(0.163)	(7.565)
Population growth, 2001–2010	-1.215	-33.567	-4.736	-1.460*	-47.021	-1.221	-32.180
	(0.780)	(32.518)	(3.413)	(0.797)	(32.498)	(0.776)	(34.200)
2009 subnational Alianza PAIS/allied vote share	-0.012*	-0.901***	0.030	-0.010	-0.823***	-0.012*	-0.918***
	(0.007)	(0.310)	(0.036)	(0.007)	(0.317)	(0.007)	(0.319)
Migration share, 1998	-0.023	6.919	1.908*	0.078	11.840	-0.018	5.860
	(0.137)	(6.417)	(1.005)	(0.141)	(7.726)	(0.146)	(7.101)
Night lights, 2001	1.049	74.608**	0.753	1.090	76.233**	1.053	73.872*
	(0.754)	(37.308)	(3.959)	(0.674)	(33.923)	(0.749)	(38.622)
Latitude	0.150	7.099	-1.071	0.093	4.562	0.146	7.918
	(0.144)	(7.262)	(0.842)	(0.155)	(7.540)	(0.165)	(8.056)
Longitude	-0.182	-2.889	-0.280	-0.194	-4.172	-0.180	-3.296
	(0.283)	(14.439)	(1.071)	(0.300)	(15.807)	(0.288)	(14.995)
Baseline bureaucracy, 2001 (log)	2.299***	-92.669***	3.458***	2.481***	-83.637***	2.307***	-94.474***
	(0.225)	(16.117)	(0.945)	(0.228)	(15.124)	(0.228)	(17.007)
Observations	213	213	213	213	213	213	213
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.734	0.415	0.484	0.716	0.368		
Adjusted R^2	0.717	0.377	0.450	0.697	0.327		
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic			38.37			38.37	38.37

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns include the listed controls and region fixed effects.
The sample excludes La Concordia because its changing administrative status prevents a stable geographic match over time.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Bureaucracy in 2010 conditional on its 2001 level

	Ordinary least squares			Instrumental variables		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Correa vote share, 2006	0.043***	0.042***	0.044***	0.028	0.031	0.034
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Bureaucrats per 1,000 residents, 2001	0.800***	0.800***	0.803***	0.819***	0.814***	0.816***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Predetermined controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population growth, 2001–2010	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
2009 subnational vote control	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	213	213	213	213	213	213
Dependent-variable mean	4.06	4.06	4.06	4.06	4.06	4.06
R^2	0.787	0.789	0.795			
Adjusted R^2	0.775	0.776	0.781			
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic				37.46	38.80	38.22


The dependent variable is bureaucrats per 1,000 residents in 2010. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The specifications condition on the same measure in 2001, replacing the log number of bureaucrats used in the main tables.
Predetermined controls include distances to Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca, migration, 2001 night lights, latitude, and longitude.
Columns (4)–(6) instrument Correa's 2006 vote share with log average school distance to the nearest repression location.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Bureaucracy estimates with region and province fixed effects

	Bureaucracy level, 2010		Bureaucracy growth, 2001–2010	
	Region FE (1)	Province FE (2)	Region FE (3)	Province FE (4)
Panel A: Ordinary least squares				
Correa vote share, 2006	0.053***	0.055***	2.675***	1.468
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.723)	(0.929)
R^2	0.734	0.799	0.415	0.568
Adjusted R^2	0.717	0.761	0.377	0.488
Panel B: Reduced form				
Distance from schools to repression (log)	-0.269*	-0.035	-16.713**	4.297
	(0.159)	(0.233)	(8.181)	(8.610)
R^2	0.716	0.787	0.368	0.559
Adjusted R^2	0.697	0.747	0.327	0.477
Panel C: First stage and instrumental variables				
Correa vote share, 2006	0.050*	0.016	3.134**	-1.946
	(0.029)	(0.095)	(1.486)	(3.701)
First stage: Distance from schools to repression (log)	-5.333***	-2.209*	-5.333***	-2.209*
	(0.861)	(1.240)	(0.861)	(1.240)
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic	38.37	3.17	38.37	3.17
Full controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	213	213	213	213

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns use the full control set described in the main text.
The region specifications reproduce the preferred columns of the main tables. The province specifications include indicators for the 23 mainland provinces represented in the sample. Province effects absorb most of the instrument's variation, leaving a weak first stage. The corresponding IV coefficients with province effects are therefore not informative about causal magnitude.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A1: Conditional first stage under region and province fixed effects



Note: Each point represents a municipality. Panel A residualizes Correa's 2006 vote share and the instrument with respect to all controls and fixed effects for natural regions. Panel B residualizes both variables with respect to the same controls and province fixed effects. The axes are common across panels, and the fitted lines show the corresponding conditional first stage relationships. The province specification includes the 23 mainland provinces represented in the analysis sample.

A.2. Additional tables and figures

Table A7: Production and population ranking of municipalities that experienced repression

Production (2010) ranking	Population (2010) ranking	Municipality
2	1	Guayaquil
1	2	Quito
3	3	Cuenca
19	12	Esmeraldas
11	15	Latacunga
20	20	Quininde
33	25	Lago Agrio
26	27	Tulcan
16	29	Ruminahui
37	32	Pasaje
29	40	Naranjal
151	145	Celica

Note: The table ranks municipalities with documented repression episodes by production, measured by the Central Bank of Ecuador, and by population in the 2010 census. The locations are not confined to either the richest or the poorest municipalities.

A.3. Survey evidence on cohort distrust and proximity to repression

As a supplementary check for the instrument's mechanism through the outsider's initial vote share, I examine whether younger cohorts are less trusting of political parties in municipalities where repression occurred closer to schools. I use two independent surveys from 2006: Ecuador Latinobarómetro and Ecuador AmericasBarometer. In each case, I regress trust in political parties on an indicator for the younger cohort, the municipal measure of repression proximity, and their interaction, controlling for region fixed effects. The interaction term captures whether the age gap in distrust is larger in municipalities where repression occurred closer to schools. In the matched Latinobarómetro sample (1,018 observations across 45 municipalities), the interaction coefficient is positive and precise. The same pattern appears in the matched AmericasBarom-

Table A8: Instrumental variables model with Conley standard errors

	(1) N. Bureaucrats 2010	(2) G. Bureaucrats 01-10
Panel A: Reduced form		
Distance: repression to nearest school (log)	-0.269	-16.713
	(0.159)*	(8.390)**
Panel B: IV estimates		
Vote share in 2006	0.050	3.134
	(0.028)*	(1.446)**
Observations	213	213
Controls	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes
K-P F-stat	38.37	38.37
Mean Dep.Var	4.06	54.13
Variation w.r.t mean	1.24	5.79

Conley standard errors in parentheses; Bartlett kernel with a 50 km cutoff.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Note: N. Bureaucrats 2010 = Number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants. G. Bureaucrats 01-10 = Growth rate of the number of bureaucrats from 2001 to 2010. Vote shares refer to the votes received by Correa in the first round of that election year. The instrument is the logarithm of the municipal average of each public school's distance to its nearest documented repression location. The table uses the 213-municipality analysis sample and the full control specification. For a description of the control variables, see the main text.

Table A9: IV estimates excluding the capital city

	(1) N. Bureaucrats 2010	(2) G. Bureaucrats 01-10
Vote share in 2006	0.050	3.104
	(0.028)*	(1.454)**
Observations	212	212
Controls	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes
K-P F-stat	38.21	38.21
Mean Dep.Var	4.04	54.07
Variation w.r.t mean	1.24	5.74

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Note: N. Bureaucrats 2010 = Number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants. G. Bureaucrats 01-10 = Growth rate of the number of bureaucrats from 2001 to 2010. Vote shares refer to the votes received by Correa in the first round of that election year. The table excludes Quito from the 213-municipality analysis sample. For a description of the control variables, see the main text.

Table A10: IV estimates for the outcome measured before treatment

	N. Bureaucrats 2001
Vote share in 2006	0.020
	(0.015)
Observations	213
Controls	Yes
Region FE	Yes
K-P F-stat	38.37
Mean Dep.Var	2.97
Variation w.r.t mean	0.67

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Note: N. Bureaucrats 2001 = Number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants before Correa's candidacy. Vote shares refer to the votes received by Correa in the first round of the 2006 election. The table uses the 213-municipality analysis sample. For a description of the control variables, see the main text.

Table A11: IV estimates with historical controls


	(1) N. Bureaucrats 2010	(2) G. Bureaucrats 01-10
Panel A: Reduced form		
Distance repression to nearest school (log)	-0.252	-12.205
	(0.185)	(6.033)**
Panel B: IV Estimates		
Vote share in 2006	0.049	2.354
	(0.036)	(1.178)**
Observations	121	121
Controls	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes
K-P F-stat	21.18	21.18
Mean Dep.Var	4.33	44.09
Variation w.r.t mean	1.12	5.34

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: N. Bureaucrats 2010 = Number of bureaucrats per 1,000 inhabitants. G. Bureaucrats 01-10 = Growth rate of the number of bureaucrats from 2001 to 2010. Vote shares refer to the votes received by Correa in the first round of that election year. The instrument is the logarithm of the municipal average of each public school's distance to its nearest documented repression location. The historical controls are the share of landholdings smaller than one hectare in 1974 and rural population growth between 1974 and 1982. For a description of the remaining control variables, see the main text.


Figure A2: IV Estimates of Capital Transfers by Year



Note: Each point is the second stage coefficient from a separate IV regression of log capital transfers per capita on Correa's 2006 vote share. The instrument is the logarithm of the municipal average of each public school's distance to its nearest documented 1984–1988 repression location. Controls and region fixed effects are as in the main paper. Bands show 90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The grey marker (2001) is a placebo before treatment; the vertical dashed line separates the placebo from the years after the election. The number of municipalities varies slightly across years (205–213) because some municipalities lack capital transfer data for particular years.


eter sample (2,901 observations across 64 municipalities). These results are suggestive rather than definitive, since both surveys cover only subsets of municipalities and the confidence intervals overlap substantially, but they provide corroborating evidence consistent with the proposed mechanism.

Figure A3: Latinobarómetro



Note: The figure plots predicted trust in political parties by cohort and by proximity of repression episodes to schools using the matched 2006 Ecuador Latinobarómetro sample. Shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals. The two lines cross at approximately log distance 3.15 (approximately 23.3 km), implying that younger cohorts are less trusting in municipalities where repression occurred closer to schools.

Figure A4: LAPOP



Note: The figure plots predicted trust in political parties by cohort and by proximity of repression episodes to schools using the matched 2006 Ecuador AmericasBarometer sample. Shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals. The two lines cross at approximately log distance 3.39 (approximately 29.7 km), implying that younger cohorts are less trusting in municipalities where repression occurred closer to schools.